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Abstract
Embedded systems are parts of our daily life and used in many fields. They can be found in smart-
phones or in modern cars including GPS, light/rain sensors and other electronic assistance mecha-
nisms. These systems may handle sensitive data (such as credit card numbers, critical information
about the host system and so on) which must be protected against external attacks as these data
may be transmitted through a communication link where attackers can connect to extract sensitive
information or inject malicious code within the system. This work presents an approach to pro-
tect communications in multiprocessor architectures. This approach is based on hardware security
enhancements acting as firewalls. These firewalls filter all data going through the system commu-
nication bus and an additional flexible cryptographic block aims to protect external memory from
attacks. Benefits of our approach are demonstrated using a case study and some custom software
applications implemented in a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). Firewalls implemented in
the target architecture allow getting a low-latency security layer with flexible cryptographic features.
To illustrate the benefit of such a solution, implementations are discussed for different MPSoCs
implemented on Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGAs. Results demonstrate a reduction up to 33% in terms of
latency overhead compared to existing efforts.
1 Introduction
For many years, embedded systems are used in our daily life: we found them in electronic devices,
automotive applications, telecommunications systems and so on. When designing such systems, sev-
eral issues have to be taken into account and one of the major concerns is about security. Since
the late 90s, security has become a key point in the development of embedded systems [1]. The
number of weaknesses is in constant progress and electronic devices have to process data with var-
ious security requirements. According to [2], security criteria are communications security, storage
security, inputs/outputs security and users authentication. This work focuses on the two first criteria
(communications and storage).
First of all, this work considers communication protection as a key point in embedded systems
development as communications channels convey several data types (application codes, confidential
data, cryptographic elements and so on) with various needs in terms of security: confidential data
must not be revealed to an unauthenticated user while application may be accessible through a
specific interface (for instance, for development purposes). Then, this work also takes care of data
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storage security: memory elements are another critical entry point for attackers as they potentially
contain plaintext data.
This work is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related works and our constraints regarding
the architecture. Sections 3 and 4 describe our solution in a static and dynamic approach. Section 5
gives an analysis in terms of security and provides implementation results in comparison with other
approaches.
2 Scientific context
2.1 Related works
Several studies dealing with security in embedded systems have been published [1, 2]. Security mech-
anisms can be implemented in two ways: hardware blocks or software functions. Software solutions
are generally slower, in terms of latency, than a pure hardware-implemented security solution. Fur-
thermore software solutions are generally more easily compromised than hardware countermeasures.
In this section, several works about memory protection are presented. Then, regarding internal
transactions protection, an overview of the main solutions is proposed.
2.1.1 Memory protection approaches
In order to provide countermeasures against the threat model defined in Section 2.2, a key point
is to address memory protection. An obvious solution is to implement cryptographic features for
memory confidentiality and integrity. XOM [3] is a solution mixing confidentiality and integrity for
systems where the external memory can be tampered. The implementation requires adding hard-
ware modules and modifying the processor structure. Using such a solution, performances are quite
spoiled as authors [3] announce a 50% loss. AEGIS architecture [4] is another approach based on a
security-enhanced processor embedding confidentiality and integrity functions. Depending on proces-
sor configuration (cache size), memory slowdown is between 3.8% and 130%. Bossuet et al. [5] made
an in-depth comparison of existing cryptographic processors where some of them, such as HCrypt,
were implemented on FPGAs. Some of these processors are efficient but do not cover our threat
model defined in a further section. In [6] authors describe a solution (called SecSoft) to protect soft-
ware with a hardware Encryption Management Unit (EMU). This work proposes a latency analysis of
several modes (block/counter modes for encryption function and with/without encryption). Latency
overhead on a ML301 platform goes from less than 10% (block mode, unencrypted) up to 80% (block
mode, encrypted). This solution does not provide mechanisms targeting integrity. [7] proposes the
PE-ICE solution to check integrity in parallel to encryption (i.e. confidentiality). The worst case
implementation shows a performance loss of 20% and for a confidentiality only implementation, a
4% loss is given. Vaslin et al. [8] proposes a confidentiality and integrity hardware block based on
AES for confidentiality and cyclic redundancy check for integrity, performance loss is about 13-14%.
In [9], authors extended this work by using the AES-GCM algorithm (this option is also used in this
work), integrity is done by a low latency function [10]. Other methods such as hash trees and formal
verification [11, 12] are use to protect memory contents.
Another solution is to use the built-in MMU (Memory Management Unit) available in some
processors. This work is implemented on a Xilinx FPGA where the softcore Microblaze is provided
as a general purpose processor. Microblaze MMU [13] provides a simple access control allowing to get
read-only or full-access memory pages in the system, this control can be disabled in a configuration
register.
All these works propose solutions to provide encryption methods for external memories protection
with different performance versus security tradeoff. In order to protect the target system from
attacks on the external memory, a trivial solution consists in building a fully-protected external
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memory unit. Unfortunately, in this case, each memory access implies a ciphering/deciphering
latency penalty. Thus, such an approach is strongly penalizing regarding the overall latency overhead
of an application. To mitigate this point, our work proposes to implement cryptographic features
only on specific memory pages, defined by application requirements, avoiding such a systematic
latency penalty. Therefore, some pages are still not protected, that is the reason why internal traffic
protection and/or monitoring must be also addressed in the context of embedded systems security.
2.1.2 Bus and NoC-based security methods
Regarding large scale systems with NoC-based communication architecture, [14] proposes a solution
where security controls are done in each network interface in a distributed manner. In this case, a
security manager unit gathers individual interfaces information and performs countermeasures and
security updates (done through dynamic partial reconfiguration). This method takes into account
processor facing denial of service attacks but does not offer ciphering function (however, authenti-
cation and integrity features are available). Fiorin et al. [15, 16, 17] propose an alternative to this
approach providing ?security sensors? inside network interfaces to refine controls (NI in Figure 1).
These sensors are able to block incoming malicious data when parameters are not proven. These
parameters are stored in a trusted CAM (Context-Addressable Memory). Finally, a SNM (Security
Network Manager) gathers information from NIs to detect potential collisions and errors in data traf-
fic. Unlike [14], security mechanisms can be updated without partial reconfiguration of the FPGA
chip, update is done using memory rewriting. [14] and [15, 16, 17] do not offer cryptographic features
to cipher data transmitted in the communication network.
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Figure 1: Fiorin’s approach [17, 15]
The solution proposed by Fiorin et al. is based on a secured Network Interface (NI) with a DPU
mechanism (Data Protection Unit, see Figure 1). This mechanism allows or not a transaction ac-
cording to parameters stored in individual trusted CAM memories. [15] requirements aim to cover
a threat model with denial of service attacks but cannot protect systems against IP modifications
performed by an attacker. This distributed approach has a low-latency and also presents some ro-
bustness. Controls are done in each interface, even if one of them is corrupted, other interfaces
should still continue to work. Regarding NoC-based security solutions, we can also cite [18, 19].
Structure proposed by Sepulveda et al. is based on a hierarchical NoC with low NoCs (each low NoC
is a sub-network having a single security policy) and a single high NoC acting as a global security
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manager (connections with each low NoC). Regarding NoC-based security, LeMay et al. [20] propose
a mechanism to detect abnormal behaviors in a NoC protocol when a malicious IP is inserted in the
system architecture: the solution based on AXI signals has an area overhead up to 23%.
Then, for bus-based MPSoCs, the main contribution was published by Coburn et al. [21]. This
approach is similar to [15, 16, 17] as it is based on security-enhanced network interfaces called SEI
(Security Enforcement Interface) but in a centralized approach. The main drawback of this solution
is that security information is sent to a global security manager which is the only component able
to perform controls. Therefore, latency overhead is increased (see Section 5). This solution does not
offer security updates or cryptographic features. Coburn et al. approach suggests to centralize all
the controls in a single module; therefore, as soon as this module is corrupted, system security is
compromised.
Compared to these efforts, our approach provides a distributed solution with update mechanisms.
We are able to dynamically adapt the security policies based on the instantaneous threats. We also
provide some cryptography mechanisms in order to fully protect the system. We propose a low-
latency solution in order to reduce the performance penalty due to security.
2.1.3 Other methods
Other solutions propose a physical separation of components in order to define secured and non-
secured areas. For instance, [22] use moats during place-and-route, routing is forbidden in these
areas, it allows isolating specific areas of the FPGA. Other contributions propose to combine hardware
and software elements to provide security. [23, 24] focus on virtualization, an hardware mechanism
associated with software services that manages several software tasks in a secured manner on an
heterogeneous architecture. Another solution is proposed by ARM, Trustzone [25]. It offers the
possibility to have two areas with different privileges. A hardware module is in charge of monitoring
data, communications between these two areas are secured if the parameters of the architecture are
set to secure. However, virtualization-based solutions are not adapted to our context: for small-scale
MPSoCs, it is assumed that hardware-based solutions are desirable. Furthermore, this work aims
to provide a solution with the lowest impact on existing OS or architecture: as virtualization adds
some mechanisms to both software and hardware layers, these solutions are not considered in our
further comparison. Our contribution could be extended with mechanisms as provided by [22]. Our
approach goes into the same direction as works developed by [23, 24] and [25], but we propose a
more comprehensive solution providing cryptography, filtering and monitoring.
2.2 Platform characterization and threat model
This work implies a set of constraints about architectures where our approach can be applied:
• FPGA chips are chosen as they allow short development times and system reconfigurability
whereas ASICs cannot be reprogrammed.
• This work is done in a context of a project where applications do not require a large number
of IPs (small-scale up to medium-scale architectures). Therefore, it is assumed that a single
communication bus is able to manage all case studies targeting MPSoCs.
• Regarding communication protocols, AXI protocol from ARM [26] is chosen. In fact, this
protocol is the standard in latest Xilinx development tools and should provide a compatibility
with other ARM-based technologies in the future such as Zynq circuits (embedding an FPGA
and a Cortex-A9 processor [27]) or Armadeus [28].
This work is based on a specific threat model for FPGA-based MPSoC architectures. At a high level
of abstraction, it is assumed that the FPGA itself is a trusted component (i.e. attackers cannot
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directly access it). On the opposite, both external bus and external memory are considered as
untrusted areas. As a consequence, we can define a range of attack scenarios that must be covered
by our approach. On the one hand, following scenarios are taken into account (non exhaustive list):
• Attack A1. External memory is compromised by replacement or modification. In this scenario,
it is considered that the attacker is able to physically replace the external memory by its own
chip. The attacker is also able to modify its contents by any means: accesses can be logical
(access with another processor) or even physical (for instance, if memory contents are modified
by overheating or exposure to an electromagnetic field).
• Attack A2. Snooping on-chip to off-chip bus through an external probe. The attacker is able
to access the physical bus between the FPGA chip and the external memory. The attacker can
read data on the bus or inject malicious data.
• Attack A3. Internal snooping on on-chip busses for data values by an untrusted IP included
in the SoC. It is considered that the attacker is able to implement an IP (hardcore or softcore)
aiming to add data to the on-chip traffic of the system. These data can be both packets with
valid address or denial-of-service attempts. The attacker is also able to retrieve data from the
bus for example to get private information.
On the other hand, following scenarios are not considered in our threat model:
• Snooping on the on-chip busses through package modification or physical probe. This work
considers that the chip cannot be physically modified after bitstream downloading.
• Attempting to measure the contention on the bus or cache-timing attacks.
• Other side-channel attacks: power analysis, electromagnetic analysis and so on.
These scenarios can be combined to construct complex attack scenarios. Two scenarios will be tested
in Section 5.2 to compare this work with existing techniques. As countermeasures, this work proposes
to focus on protecting and monitoring the internal traffic as well as protecting the external memory.
2.3 Main contributions
Contributions provided in this work aim to protect external memories and internal traffic in multi-
processor architectures implemented on FPGA circuits. Our approach provides the demonstration
that a complete end-to-end solution is possible. Such an approach allows reducing the performance
penalty due to cryptographic features as all communications are not encrypted while still guarante-
ing that unprotected code or data will not lead to an attack on the system thanks to internal traffic
protection/monitoring. Our solution represents an interesting alternative compared to [15, 21] with
an additional security layer including cryptographic services.
Table 1 presents a summary of qualitative parameters targeted by our solution (which is basically de-
scribed in Section 3). This work enhances existing efforts by providing a solution for a comprehensive
protection of internal and external communications:
• For traffic monitoring and protection, our approach is similar to [15] but it provides a more
efficient solution for security updates in terms of memory consumption. This contribution is
detailed in Section 5.
• For memory countermeasures, our approach is similar to [6, 7] but the AES-GCM cryptographic
primitive is used as proposed by [9]. Such a solution allows reducing the cryptography latency
overhead while maintaining a strong level of protection. Compared to [6, 7], we rely on a more
comprehensive security policy where developer can finely tune his/her cryptography needs.
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Table 1: Comparison of existing solutions
[9] [13] [3, 4] [14] [16] [19] [21] This work
Communication
technology
N/A N/A N/A
NoC
(mesh)
NoC
(mesh)
NoC
(hierarchical)
Bus
(AMBA)
Bus
(AXI)
Approach
Mem.
extension
Proc.
extension
Proc.
extension
Centralized
IP
Distributed
interfaces
Distributed
IPs
Centralized
IP
Distributed
interfaces
Security updates No No No No Yes No No Yes
Counter-
measures
Confidentiality Yes No Yes No No No No Yes
Integrity Yes No Yes No No No No Yes
Memory
partitioning
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Traffic
monitoring
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Access
control (R/W)
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threat
model
coverage
Attack A1 Yes No Yes No No No No Yes
Attack A2 Yes No Yes No No No No Yes
Attack A3 No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Then, this work also presents a feedback feature for security mechanisms (Section 4): that is to say
how attacks are detected and how the update manager takes care of these information. Finally, an
evaluation in terms of implementation results and security analysis is given.
3 Static security for communications and memories
In order to secure MPSoCs, this work proposes an approach with hardware security components
(also known as “firewalls”) implemented in the architecture. Figure 2 shows an example of such a
system.
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Figure 2: Generic MPSoC with hardware firewalls
A key point when dealing with security corresponds to the need of clearly setting up all parameters
chosen to protect an MPSoC against a given threat model. Thus before discussing our approach, a
set of rules (or security policies) is defined for each access in the system.
3.1 Security policy
Each security policy is defined by several parameters:
• The memory segment base/high addresses. An essential feature of firewalls is to block illegal
accesses in terms of addresses. For instance, an illegal access to a memory section by a general
purpose processor which is not allowed by the application specifications must be discarded
(writing a confidential data 190 into memory, reading a section with cryptographic-related
information. . . ).
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• In order to avoid attacks such as “buffer overflow”, data format has to be analyzed for each
transaction (both read and write operations).
• As systems contain an external memory, cryptographic primitives are used for data protection.
According to the application requirements, some memory sections may not be ciphered if the
contents are not critical.
As described in Figure 2, a generic MPSoC contains an external memory. Thus the most radical
solution to guarantee security consists in protecting the whole memory in terms of confidentiality and
authentication. In such a case, an attacker cannot decipher or modify its contents. Unfortunately,
this solution has an important overhead in terms of latency (see Section 5). An alternative solution
consists in ciphering only the most critical memory sections. In this case, an attacker can read
and write all the other plaintext memory sections. That is the reason why implementation of a
cryptographic function only is not efficient enough to protect the target MPSoC against the defined
threat model. Therefore, firewalls also aim to protect the system against these plaintext contents by
monitoring the internal communications.
3.2 Local Firewall
Each firewall is composed of several blocks (Security Builder and Firewall Interface) connected as
defined in Figure 3. The Security Builder module is responsible for security policy management
and the Firewall Interface is a mandatory checkpoint towards the external world (that is to say,
the system communication bus). This module acts as a gateway between the AXI-4 communication
bus and the associated IP (it can be dedicated to an application, an I/O controller, a memory
interface. . . ).
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Module
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Figure 3: Structure of a Local Firewall
The whole firewall structure is considered as a trusted area (it is implemented in hardware in the
FPGA chip), the only part to be untrusted is composed of the external bus and the external memory
(components linked to the Cryptographic Firewall).
7
3.2.1 Firewall Interface
The Firewall Interface module (#1 in Figure 3) performs mainly two tasks:
• Once a data block has been analyzed and validated (its parameters match with the associated
security policy), the Firewall Interface transmits data to the transaction target (communication
bus or IP); this operation is done by the Decision Module.
• The Firewall Interface synchronizes the communication protocol signals such as handshake sig-
nals (AXI WVALID, AXI RREADY . . . ) or other control signals (AXI WSTRB, AXI WLAST . . . )
to keep valid transactions. Data block is synchronized with its control signals in order to avoid
data loss and/or duplication. The sub-component Synchronization Module is composed of a set
of flip-flops (see Figure 4) where the clock port (at least its rising edge) is the acknowledgment
signal check out sent by the Security Builder when all the data checking has been performed.
Q
Q
DÉFINIR
CLR
D
Q
Q
DÉFINIR
CLR
D
Q
Q
DÉFINIR
CLR
D
[…]
Clock 
signal
AXI_ARREADY AXI_WREADY AXI_AWREADY
AXI_ARREADY AXI_WREADY AXI_AWREADY
Figure 4: Structure of a Synchronization Module
As all the flip-flops are connected in parallel, the overall Firewall Interface latency is of 2 cycles for
each data block: 1 cycle for the Decision Module and 1 cycle for the synchronization step.
3.2.2 Security Builder
The Security Builder module is the main component within firewalls (#2 in Figure 3). It is composed
of 4 submodules:
• Correspondence Table (CorrTable). Security policies are stored in a Block RAM memory
considered as a trusted entity (upper left corner in Figure 3) and can be identified by an address.
Internal structure of Correspondence Table is detailed in Figure 5. Each policy is defined for
a given physical address space (with lower and upper bounds), transcription towards policies
addresses is done as defined in Algorithm 1.
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Figure 5: Implementation of a Correspondence Table
Given that N is the number of entries of the Correspondence Table (i.e. the number of security
policies embedded in the firewall), BRAM A is initially equal to zero. If the bus address is
contained in a given address space (defined with reglow and reghigh), BRAM A is set to this
value. Otherwise if BUS A is outside the address space, a flag is set to high value (this flag
reports an error and is treated by the global finite state machine embedded in each firewall).
Algorithm 1: Correspondence Table loookup
Require: n ≤ Nmax {Nmax: max number of entries}
1: BUS A← bus addr {Get a copy of bus address}
2: BRAM A← 0x00000000 {Initialize output}
3: for SUBMODULE = 1 to N do{For each submodule}
4: if BUS A ∈ [reglow; reghigh[ then {If submodule contains the bus address}
5: BRAM A← regout {Write the location of security policy}
6: end if
7: end for
8: if BRAM A = 0 then {If the output register is null}
9: not found flag ← 1 {Set a warning flag !}
10: end if
11: bram addr ← BRAM A {Export the output to other components}
• Reading Module (ReadMod). ReadMod is in charge of reading security policies from the
dedicated Block RAM trusted memory and extracting security parameters to be transmitted
to the Checking Module. For a single 32-bit word, a reading buffer is filled in 1 clock cycle.
Then, security parameters are transmitted to the Checking Module in 1 additional cycle.
• Checking Module (CheckMod). For a simple implementation, Checking Module verifies
two parameters: read/write access right and data format thanks to a set of comparators and a
test function (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Structure of a Checking Module
First, there is a preliminary test on the value of the ARID signal extracted from the bus:
when this signal is not equal to 0, the data being analyzed is associated with a read; otherwise
(ARID=0 ), it is related with a write operation. This test function output is used to check two
parameters:
– The select input of a multiplexer for format value verification (ARSIZE and AWSIZE
contain format values for read and write operations [26]).
– Then, access right and data format are compared with sp rnw and sp format values ex-
tracted from the security policy. As all the parameters are instantiated in parallel (see
Figure 6), all the parameters are analyzed at the same time. In Figure 6, inverters and
the OR gate produce a global signal representative of all the controls done in the Checking
Module: if one or more comparators go wrong, the final output will be 0 (in the other
case, when all comparators go fine, the output is 1).
• Finite State Machine (FSM): the FSM managing firewall behavior.
idle
addr
parchkFAIL
OK
Figure 7: FSM associated with the Security Builder module
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FSM described in Figure 7 represents the simplified behavior of a Security Builder embedded in a
Local Firewall (see Figure 3). It contains the main states of this module (without error procedure or
cryptographic feature):
• Idle state. The Security Builder module waits for a new incoming data to be analyzed (and
received from the Firewall Interface).
• Addr state. Allowance to recover Block RAM address where data is located.
• Par state. Security policy reading step
• Chk state. Checking operation performed in 2 clock cycles: 1 cycle for the preliminary test and
another cycle for the combinatorial part (comparators and gates). If parameters match with
the security policy, OK state is enabled (otherwise, FAIL state).
In order to have a complete firewall behavior, the final step is the transmission of the check out signal
to the Firewall Interface sub-module: if checking operations match with the security policy, signals
are transmitted in a synchronized manner; otherwise, data are not transmitted (the process resulting
from an error is described later in this paper). Checking a 32-bit data word takes 4 clock cycles.
Therefore, checking N 32-bit data words is done in 4N clock cycles in a non-pipelined architecture.
Local Firewalls allow to monitor and to filter any communication on the bus. They do not monitor
the internal execution flow of processors and their associated cache behaviors. If an attacker sets up
a cache based attack (e.g. trace-driven or time-driven), Local Firewalls will not block such an attack
as it does not correspond to illegal operations (i.e. access right, data format). Additional solution
(e.g. software-based solution) should be used to provide some countermeasures against this type of
attacks. If an attacker tampers an application code that is not protected with integrity mechanisms
and if this malicious code tries to perform illegal accesses then Local Firewalls will detect and block
this attack. Local Firewalls do not protect against side channel attacks but allow to detect and stop
any attack that does not respect the security policies associated with an application. Extending
these mechanisms with cryptography properties enables to address a large class of potential attacks.
3.3 Cryptographic Firewall
The external memory controller has a dedicated firewall offering cryptographic features in addition
to security services embedded in a Local Firewall. This type of firewall (also known as Cryptographic
Firewall) is able to protect data stored in the external memory in terms of confidentiality and
authentication. The overall structure of a Cryptographic Firewall is shown in Figure 8.
The main difference between a Local and a Cryptographic Firewall is the Security Builder. Datapath
is modified to take into account confidentiality and integrity features implemented in a Cryptographic
Firewall :
• In case of a read: the first step is to get the security policy associated with data currently
analyzed. Then, data is processed by the cryptographic module (deciphering and eventually
authentication checking) before being sent to the Security Builder (verification of access rights,
data format. . . ).
• In case of a write: datapath goes through the Security Builder before going to the cryptographic
module if parameters match (check out=1 ).
In this contribution, firewalls have to operate with a low-latency feature. Therefore, a global pro-
tection of external memories (in terms of confidentiality and authentication) is not the best option.
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Figure 8: Structure of a Cryptographic Firewall
That is the reason why we want to implement an algorithm offering confidentiality and authentica-
tion separately (the security mode is specified by the security policies). Four options are considered
in this work:
• AES + MD5. The simplest solution uses the AES standard for confidentiality and a hash
function such as MD5 for integrity. Even if it has been developed in the early 90s, MD5 is still
widely used [29, 30].
• AES + SHA-2. Developed when security weaknesses were discovered in MD5. According to
several surveys1, other weaknesses were highlighted and implementations with better security
were developed.
• AES + SHA-3. NIST2 launched a contest in 2007 to define SHA-3. The winner was announced
in October 2012, it is a protocol developed by STMicroelectronics and NXP named Keccak3.
For experimentations, we use results extracted from the ATHENA database created by George
Mason University4 for implementations on Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGAs.
• AES-GCM. This particular mode of AES is able to perform authenticated ciphering. Confiden-
tiality is guaranteed by plaintext ciphering in CTR mode and authentication is performed by
a MAC calculation. [9] proposes a comparison of various AES modes and a detailed analysis
of AES-GCM mode.
In order to choose the best option in our context of low latency, two metrics are used: latency on a
32-bit data block and throughput of a basic implementation. Results associated to each option are
shown in Table 2.
According to Table 2, the best option is AES-GCM (four times faster than solutions based on hash
functions). The structure of this mode is described in Figure 9. According to these first results,
Keccak (SHA-3 standard) has also interesting performances and could be considered as another
alternative.
1http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/207.pdf
2National Institute of Standards and Technology
3http://keccak.noekeon.org/
4http://cryptography.gmu.edu/athenadb/fpga hash/table view
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Table 2: Modes comparison for the cryptographic block
Latency
(# of cycles)
Throughput
AES + MD5
[29, 30]
90 up to 725 Mbits/s
AES + SHA-2
[31]
74 up to 1.8 Gbits/s
AES + SHA-3
(Keccak)
25 around 30 Gbits/s
AES-GCM
[32]
25 30 Gbits/s
CPT0
Ek
CPT1
Ek
PT1
CT1
multH multH
AAD
multH
TAG
PT
C+I
I only
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mode
I
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Figure 9: Cryptographic Module: AES-GCM
According to Figure 9, a single module is able to perform several options (“confidentiality and
authentication”, “authentication only”or “plaintext”). Multiplexors and demultiplexors ports are
implemented in order to take into account the security policy parameters defining the confidentiality
and authentication properties (respectively Cmode and Imode). It allows the block to take different
datapaths producing ciphertext and tag (and even bypass the whole module if no cryptographic
feature is enabled). Keys used for encryption/decryption are extracted from the security policies and
sent by the Reading Module (as all information related to MACs).
In AES-GCM algorithm, confidentiality is performed by plaintext ciphering. AES function (in
CTR mode) in Ek blocks generates keystreams (with the key extracted from the security policies
stored in a trusted on-chip memory). A timestamp value is used as an input of the AES-GCM to
avoid replay attacks. Finally, a XOR is performed with the keystream and the plaintext to produce
the ciphertext which can be transmitted to the external memory controller. Authentication is made
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with a MAC based on universal hash. AAD is a data that can potentially be authenticated without
being ciphered.
In Figure 9, encryption of a 32-bit data (Ek uses a 128-bit key and a 128-bit data containing
the data block to be ciphered on 32 bits and padded with zeros) is performed in 10 clock cycles and
authentication in 2 additional cycles (2 Galois multipliers MULTH are needed [9, 10]). The overall
latency for a set of N 32-bit data protected in terms of confidentiality and authentication is given by
Equation 1.
latency(N) = 10 + (10 + 2) ∗N (1)
Finally, using AES-GCM allows firewalls to provide low-latency cryptographic features to the final
user while keeping flexibility in terms of available modes (confidentiality and authentication). In
particular for authentication, AES-GCM takes 2 clock cycles while MD5 (respectively SHA-2) takes
64 (respectively 80) cycles to do so. Tag produced by the AES-GCM core is not ciphered as it is
stored in a trusted Block RAM memory. As Block RAMs are dual-port memories, one port is left
free for further parameters update operations (these operations are described in Section 4).
4 Update services for dynamic hardware firewall configura-
tion
4.1 Security leakages in static security
Section 3 proposes a solution to protect a multiprocessor architecture with static security enhance-
ments. Unfortunately, this is a solution where security policies cannot be updated in case of an
attack. At this step, firewalls only detect an attack thanks to the Security Builder. Therefore, mech-
anisms are needed to update firewall rules without creating security weaknesses within the system.
Security update can be done by partial or complete reconfiguration (download of a partial or com-
plete bitstream). However, the solution proposed to update the security policies in this section aims
to have the following features:
• No system blocking. System behavior should not be stopped during security updates. Further-
more, malicious data must not leak during this process.
• Low-latency update. Security must be updated as fast as possible.
• Different security modes. Firewalls should offer a hierarchy of security levels in order to allow
mechanisms to be set in a more or less permissive mode. It is assumed that security levels are
defined by access rights (read/write, read-only and so on).
4.2 Security policies evolution
Two categories of components are defined according to their ability to handle confidential information.
For instance, critical IPs such as encryption blocks must not reveal information in case of an attack.
If an attacker is able to extract cryptographic keys, it would be a major failure for the embedded
system. In this case, critical IPs must be placed in a quarantine mode where no read or write are
allowed. For non-critical IPs, an intermediate mode is defined where only read accesses are allowed.
This feature allows backing up firewalls configuration and confidential information before eventually
switching to the quarantine mode.
In the most critical case, when an attack is detected by a firewall already set to the quarantine
mode, it is assumed that the system must be completely reset. Therefore, the initial bitstream
(containing initial security policies) is downloaded into the FPGA chip to ensure a secure execution
environment to the system.
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When a firewall has to be updated, there are two potential areas to be modified:
• Correspondence Table module: it defines the relationship between the address spaces and a
related security policy. In this work, it is considered that all the address spaces of each IP are
covered by, at least, one security policy. Therefore, the only component to be updated is the
memory containing the security policies as explained below.
• Block RAM memory containing the security policies. These memories contain the rules to be
verified for each communication and memory access.
For both Local and Cryptographic firewalls, information related to read/write access rights is stored
in a 32-bit word in a Block RAM memory. As a result, updating a security policy means writing a
32-bit word (with new access rights values) in a BRAM; this is done in one clock cycle5. Finally,
updating N security policies in one firewall is performed according to the following equation:
duration(N) = N cycles (2)
4.3 Update services architecture
When an attack is detected, Block RAMs must be updated with the new security policies in order to
keep a secure execution environment. All the components are connected to an AXI-Lite communi-
cation bus (labeled “security bus” in Figure 10). A dedicated processor (labeled “update processor”
in Figure 10) keeps records of all important events in a log file (timestamps, attacks and update
progress).
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Figure 10: Global architecture of the monitoring area and update services
5http://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/ip documentation/axi bram ctrl/v1 03 a/ds777 axi bram ctrl.pdf
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Each firewall has a connection with a monitoring IP through a dedicated bus. While this IP and a
timer are used for attack detection and reporting, BRAM controllers are used to update the security
policies embedded in each firewall BRAM memory. As the code of the “update processor”is stored in
a trusted on-chip memory (as the architecture is composed of the security bus, timer log and custom
bus), this update process cannot be tampered by malicious accesses.
4.3.1 Monitoring IP
The first operation performed by the architecture presented in Figure 10 is the monitoring of attack
events thanks to a dedicated IP (labeled “Monitoring IP”in Figure 10). In order to detect attacks,
three flags are extracted from firewalls (both Local and Cryptographic):
• checkFlag (cF): one of the controls (read/write access right or data format) failed in the Check-
ing Module. This signal is similar to the check out signal described in Section 3.
• notFoundFlag (nF): attempt to access an unknown address (i.e. an address not included in the
Correspondence Table).
• authenticationFlag (aF): authentication verification failed (flag specific to a Cryptographic Fire-
wall linked to the external memory controller).
Security Builder
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Module
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Interface
Figure 11: Generic structure of a firewall with flags extraction
Figure 11 shows a mixed structure of a Local Firewall and a Cryptographic Firewall. Each flag is
stored on a significant bit in internal registers of the monitoring IP (each IP has a dedicated register).
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Figure 12 shows the detailed structure of the monitoring IP. Each firewall provides its flag infor-
mation through a custom bus (address and data). Each regi is a 32-bit register with only 3 significant
bits (corresponding to 3 flags). The main register regm concatenates all the significant bits. As regm
register is also on 32 bits, the monitoring IP can manage up to 10 firewall registers. An interruption
controller reads the main register regm and sends an interrupt request to the update processor as
soon as one of the regm bits is equal to zero (i.e. when an error is detected by a firewall). This
update processor (executing the interrupt routine) has several features:
• This processor is aware of the security context: security modes (see Section 3) are known for
each firewall.
• When a firewall has to be updated, security policies are set to a less permissive configuration.
Beyond these monitoring tasks, this processor is also in charge of the security policies update (i.e.
writing new values in Block RAMs linked to firewalls).
4.3.2 Security update protocol
Compared to the static protection described in Section 3, firewall structure is slightly modified. Both
Block RAM data ports are used (one directly connected to the firewall, the other connected to the
update processor). Therefore, it may happen that both data ports are used at the same time to
access the same memory location. The architecture presented in Figure 13 has a mechanism, based
on communication properties to avoid such cases.
MPSoCs considered in this work use the AXI protocol from ARM as the communication bus.
Transactions in AXI protocol are based on a “handshake” protocol with couples of valid/ready
signals for address and data channels (for both read and write [26]). Output information is only
available when both signals (valid and ready) are in their high state (no information is transmitted
in other cases). All the transactions using the AXI communication protocol are performed in two
steps: a handshake on addresses is performed before a handshake on data signals.
Therefore, a mechanism is implemented in each Firewall Interface module to avoid concurrent
accesses to BRAM memory location by both firewall and update processor. When an attack is
detected in a firewall, output ready signals of the Firewall Interface are kept in their low state.
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This step aims to “freeze” the communication bus and prevent malicious accesses during the update
process. Then, the update process is executed in accordance with the simplified architecture shown
in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Partial architecture of a firewall with update process information
First, security update is enabled by the update processor writing a “1” value in the recfgEn register
embedded in the Security Builder. Thus, the FSM associated to this process goes from a monitoring
state to an update state. Then, while the processor retrieves the new security policy to be written
into the memories, all transactions are blocked as previously described using the “handshake” feature.
If a rising edge occurs on a ready signal (arready in or awready in), it is blocked until the update
process is finished (i.e. arready out = 0 and awready out = 0 while recfgEn = 1) and a “1”value
is written into the readyEvent register embedded in the Firewall Interface module. When the new
security policy has been written, the update processor writes a “0”value in the recfgEn register to
notify the end of the process.
Finally, according to the readyEvent register value, data blocked in the input port of the Firewall
Interface is analyzed with the new security policy only if readyEvent = 1 (i.e. if a rising edge on a
ready signal has been detected during update). The overall latency of the update process depends
on the number of security policies to be modified. This process usually contains five steps:
• Extracting flags from firewalls to the monitoring IP and blocking of firewalls. This step is done
in 1 clock cycle.
• Interruption routine execution. An interrupt request is sent in 2 cycles.
• Computation of the new security configuration (performed in software). It corresponds to the
software latency on the update processor. For a basic implementation, the new security policy
is retrieved in 148 clock cycles. Nevertheless, other algorithms may be considered. In this case,
response time would be impacted.
• Writing the new security policy. This step depends of the number of security policies to be
written. Results are given in Section 5.
• Reactivation of the main application after update completeness. This is done in 1 clock cycle.
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5 Implementation results
5.1 Experimental setup
In order to validate this contribution, implementations and simulations are done on a case study
representative of a real embedded system on a Xilinx ML605 development board (including a Virtex-
6 FPGA). We have developed a system performing image processing operations. Its architecture is
shown in Figure 14, it contains 2 MicroBlaze softcore processors and 2 IPs:
• An image processing IP. This IP contains several programmable registers and performs a thresh-
old function on a picture.
• It is assumed that temporary pictures and other information (code, user profiles and so on) are
stored in a shared Block RAM memory.
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Figure 14: Case study architecture
It is also assumed that the external memory is shared between the 2 processors and split into memory
sections of 32 MB each:
• Processor MB1: 1 code section (C11) and 2 data sections (D11 and D12).
• Processor MB2: 1 code section (C21) and 1 data section (D21).
Regarding cryptographic options, memory sections can be protected in “confidentiality and integrity”
(C11 and D11), “integrity only” (D12) or even in plaintext (C21 and D21). All transactions are based
on a 32-bit data format. Finally access rights are defined in Table 3.
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Table 3: Access rights for the case study
Shared
memory
Image
processing
External memory
C21, D21 C11, D11, D12
MB1 Read only Read/write No access Read/write
MB2 Read/write Write only Read/write No access
These security policies are built to illustrate all the cases (in terms of policies and cryptographic
options) on a multiprocessor architecture implemented on a FPGA chip. Then, the case study has
some requirements on the software layer (for both applications and operating systems):
• On the one hand, there are some requirements on the operating system. The standalone
OS provided by Xilinx development tools is used: it does not take into account multitask
aspects but allows making measurements on communications between elements of the system.
Consequently, a POSIX6 compliant operating system is used to run custom applications picProc,
picDRM and picDec. Xilkernel (from Xilinx) is chosen but muCOS7 or muCLinux8 could have
been considered as well.
• On the other hand, custom applications are developed to illustrate all the situations (access to
memories, communications between processors. . . ).
The main application picProc is based on a sample JPEG image. All operations are saved in a log
file. picProc is executed through the following steps:
• First, MB1 reads the image from the external memory (m encryptP ic) and processes a software
deciphering.
• Then, the plaintext image m decryptP ic is stored in the shared BRAM memory.
• The next step is the transfer of the plaintext image to the threshold IP. This is performed again
by processor MB1.
• Finally, processor MB2 writes the threshold image (m processedP ic) in plaintext into the
external memory.
The picProc application process is summarized in Figure 15.
Beyond that, other applications are used to evaluate the case study:
• picDRM is an application ran by a processor checking DRM rights of the target image while
the other processor does read/write operations.
• picDec is an application performing a software deciphering of an image by a unique processor.
It serves as a reference for latency results as it does not imply a Cryptographic Firewall.
6http://standards.ieee.org/develop/wg/POSIX.html
7http://micrium.com/rtos/ucosii/overview/
8http://www.uclinux.org/
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Figure 15: Illustration of picProc on the case study
5.2 Security analysis
5.2.1 Context
The main goal of this section is to provide a security analysis for this work compared to other
approaches [17, 21]. This analysis is based on the case study described in the previous section where
two attack scenarios will be discussed to verify how implementations behave against the threat model
defined in Section 2. Implementations of [17] and [21] on the previously defined case study is described
in Figure 16.
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Figure 16: Distributed and centralized behaviors
In Figure 16, it is assumed that the communication network is the one used in each reference. This is
due to the fact that in [17, 21] security mechanisms rely partially on the communication architecture.
In the original case study, there are memory pages with several cryptographic features.
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This security analysis explores three options for our approach:
• Without cryptographic features (to be fair with existing works that do not provide such ser-
vices). Therefore, all the data is in plaintext. It would be similar to the case where only Local
Firewalls are implemented.
• With integrity only.
• With both confidentiality and integrity (the full AES-GCM core is enabled).
Then, the two scenarios considered in this analysis are as follows:
• Scenario S1. In a OCR (Optical Character Recognition) context, an attacker changes a plaintext
data packet with another. For example, a packet containing an image and the address of the
next packet is replaced with a noised version and an unknown address. In this case, the
threshold function computes an unexpected result.
• Scenario S2. Actually, the threshold value is hardcoded in the IP. It is assumed that the attacker
was able to either build another IP with another threshold value or reconfigure the system with
his malicious IP. As the threshold is different, the result will lead to different results: especially
in a OCR context, this attack may dramatically change the application performance.
Following subsections described how implementations of existing works behave according to these
scenarios.
5.2.2 Scenario S1
With integrity only. In this case, the modified data is detected by the Cryptographic Firewall.
With confidentiality and integrity. Beyond the fact that data is ciphered, the attack is detected
by the Cryptographic Firewall with integrity checking.
Without cryptographic services. For this work, it is considered that a simple Local Firewall is at-
tached to the external memory controller for our approach. For both [17] and this work, the malicious
packet will be correctly read by processor MB1. Packet will be blocked only at the communication
interface of MB1. For [21], even if the process is similar, the attack is detected later at the security
manager layer which is decentralized in a specific IP. For the second stage of this attack (transmission
to a corrupted address), [17] and this work still detect it at MB1 bus interface while [21] detects it
even later within its security manager.
5.2.3 Scenario S2
This scenario is different as a malicious IP is implemented in the system. Therefore, cryptographic
features that can be applied to this work (AES-GCM core in the Cryptographic Firewall) are not
relevant. [17] and [21] behaves as the previous attack. This work is more relevant as the malicious
IP does not provides a Local Firewall, monitoring process will be stopped earlier (as soon as data
comes in the threshold IP interface): in fact, the update processor (described in Section 4) is also
responsible for monitoring firewalls states. As a consequence, the update processor is aware that the
threshold function is performed by an untrusted entity.
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5.2.4 XBox 360 use case
Security in game consoles has been a hot topic since the 90s with the introduction of modchips for
the first generation of Playstation [33]. The XBox 360 is a game console developed by Microsoft in
2005. It was one of the first consoles to take into account existing vulnerabilities aiming to take the
control of the platform. XBox 360 was designed to include several security functions. The default
memory layout of such a console is presented in Figure 17.
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Figure 17: Xbox 360 memory layout
RAM memory is divided in four sections: game/kernel data, game/kernel code, execution section
(reserved for reads and writes during runtime) and hypervisor code. Furthermore, the game/kernel
data section (which is in plaintext) must be accessed through DMA for specific purposes (basically
GPU-related operations) while other memory sections are secured (at least, in terms of confidential-
ity). In this default configuration, data section is a clear security breaches which can lead to critical
exploits such as the “King Kong” attack: this is a well-known method where the attacker uses an
event where the GPU access data section in order to get hypervisor-like privileges. In case the system
is compromised, the system could accessed unexpected sections. If Local Firewalls are implemented
in such a system, even if the memory is compromised by one of its memory sections, the approach
described in this work could detect the attack in two times:
• As security rules are written in secured on-chip memories, it is considered that accesses to
privileged sections can be blocked.
• Even if an hypervisor-like user perfoms unwanted operations on other components of the console
architecture, abnormal behaviors are detected through Local Firewalls.
Given the fact that console developers are able to implement their architectures on a FPGA chip, the
solution described in this work is an efficient solution to block malicious exploits at both hardware
and software levels.
5.3 Experimental results for static and dynamic security
5.3.1 Area results
This study is about firewall areas compared to a reference (a MicroBlaze softcore processor running
at 100MHz without caches). Firewalls structure was described in Section 3. The Correspondence
Table is the only module with a relation between area and security (3 registers are needed to define
each security policy).
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It is assumed that the following results consider the worst case (i.e. the largest Correspondence Table
with 10 security policies). Table 4 shows area results of both firewalls (Local and Cryptographic)
compared to the reference MicroBlaze processor.
Table 4: Area results of firewall implementation
Slices Slice regs LUTs # of Block RAMs
Local
Firewall
Firewall Interface
Security Builder
76
23
120
3
68
55
0
1
Total 99 123 293 1
Crypto
Firewall
Firewall Interface
76
23
120
3
153
55
0
1
Crypto Module
1,166
89.42%
2,038
94.31%
2,396
89.10%
14
93.33%
Total 1,304 2,161 2,689 15
MicroBlaze 1,179 1,298 1,829 10
One Local Firewall has an acceptable area cost compared to one Cryptographic Firewall (around 9%)
and to one Microblaze (in this case, nearly 11%). This is essentially due to the AES-GCM ciphering
core: its area corresponds to 90% of the overall area of one Cryptographic Firewall. Therefore, we
can also estimate the area of a complete system embedding x Local Firewalls and y Cryptographic
Firewalls. It is assumed that synthesis tools are linear: the area of a structure with 2 identical
modules is twice the area of a single module. Areas in terms of slices, registers and LUTs are given
in following equations:
numSlices = 138× x + 1, 304× y (3)
numRegs = 123× x + 2, 161× y (4)
numLuts = 293× x + 2, 689× y (5)
Designer can use these equations to estimate the cost of the hardware firewalls for his/her system.
Table 5 shows area overheads due to the update mechanisms presented in Section 4.
Table 5: Synthesis results for the update mechanisms on a Local Firewall
Slices Slice regs LUTs # of BRAMs
Static solution
(Local Firewall)
138 123 293 1
Improvements
for update
solutions
Real time 6 0 5 0
Quarantine 17 0 18 0
Total overhead 5 13 15 0
Total overhead +20.29% +10.57% +12.97% +0.00%
Table 5 only shows modifications on a firewall (a complete solution would include a processor, a
communication bus. . . ). The “improvements for update”contribution corresponds to flip-flops used
to block the data during the update process (see Section 4). Otherwise, extensions on a Local Firewall
leads to a 20% area overhead (it would be relatively lower on a Cryptographic Firewall). Table 6
shows area overheads described in Section 5.1.
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Table 6: Area results of several configurations
Slices Regs LUTs # of BRAMs
Solution x0
without firewalls
5,446 7,195 8,354 32
Solution x1a with firewalls
and without updates
7,302
+34.08%
9,848
+36.87%
12,215
+46.22%
51
+37.25%
Solution x1b with firewalls
and update
7,442
+1.92%
9,913
+0.66%
12,405
+1.55%
51
+0.00%
Solution x2a with firewalls
and without update
+23.38% +22.71% +32% +44.25%
Four configurations are taken into account:
• x0: this is the original case study without firewalls as shown in Figure 14.
• x1a: x0 architecture with static firewalls as described in Section 3.
• x1b: x1a architecture with update improvements (Section 4).
• x2a: twice x1a architecture with static firewalls as described in Section 3: 4 processors, 4 IPs
but still one external memory. This configuration is used to illustrate the scalability of the
firewalls approach described is this work.
Case study with static firewalls implies a significant area overhead (34% in terms of slices): this is
mainly due to the AES-GCM core embedded in the Cryptographic Firewall. Logic added for update
purposes implies an overhead less than 2% compared to the static version. Regarding the scalability
of this approach, the area overhead is up to 24% in terms of slices for a case study twice larger
(configuration x2a). It must be noted that the area overhead would proportionally decrease as the
architecture grows up (in terms of percentages). Finally, it is possible to make a quantitative and
qualitative comparison with [16, 21]. Table 7 presents some results.
Table 7: Comparison with existing efforts
[21] [17] [13] [9] This work
Standalone
monitoring
block
Processor
ratio (%)
SEI DPU Full SMM + Ctrl LF
6.20% 25% 100% 73% 11.30%
Reference
(LUTs)
N/A N/A 1829 947 293
Case study
overhead
Reference N/A N/A
Nude +1 SMM/Ctrl +4 LF
+0% +11.34% +14.03%
Custom
+1 LF +4 LF Nude +1 LF +4 LF
+11.30% +14.03% +0% +11.30% +14.03%
Update
features
No Yes No No Yes
In terms of area, this work is less efficient than the SECA solution [21]: we propose an approach where
controls are performed in each firewall while SECA has a centralized security checker. Otherwise,
our approach is better than [16] solution: for security update, no additional memory is needed as a
communication property is used to block data (“handshake” feature of AXI protocol) while Fiorin
et al. approach stores all incoming data in a buffer until update completeness.
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5.3.2 Latency results
In this section we propose to analyze the latency of realistic scenarios based on applications described
in Section 5.1 (picProc, picDRM and picDec). Simulations were done with the following scenarios:
• S0: latency of a single Local Firewall.
• S1: communication between two elements within the architecture (use of two Local Firewalls).
• S2: communication between a processor and an external memory section protected with con-
fidentiality and integrity (implies one Local Firewall and a Cryptographic Firewall).
• S3: communication between a processor and an integrity only section in the external memory.
• S4: communication between a processor and a plaintext section in the external memory.
Latency of a Local Firewall (scenario S0) serves as a reference, other scenarios imply two firewalls
(two Local for S1 while S2, S3 and S4 use one Local and one Cryptographic Firewall). Results are
given in Figure 18. In terms of latency, the most critical scenario is S2 as it implies cryptographic
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Figure 18: Latency results of scenarios
operations (access to the external memory). S2 lasts for 28 clock cycles:
• 6 cycles for the security policy checking as in a Local Firewall, identically to scenario S0.
• According to AES-GCM, protection with confidentiality/integrity of N data blocks is performed
in 10 + (10 + 2)×N cycles (therefore, 22 cycles for a single data block).
Case study with 8KB caches (both instruction and data) is considered in this study. It is assumed
that the overall execution time is divided in two parts:
• Accesses to the external memory (cache miss or read/write operations). It implies 1 Crypto-
graphic Firewall and 1 Local Firewall.
• Internal accesses (between a processor and an IP or between two processors). This option only
implies Local Firewalls.
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Table 8: Latency overheads for custom applications
Execution
time (ms)
# of accesses
to external memory
Latency overhead
[17] and this work
approach
picProc 3,623 34,063,298 17.76%
picDrm 1,084 9,642,055 9.43%
picDev 382 4,736,966 4.18%
Timers and processor specific registers are used to extract information and compare latency over-
heads. The simplest application (picDec) has an overhead lower than 5% (it does not require cryp-
tographic features). picProc is the application with the highest penalty (nearly 18%) as it implies
a Cryptographic Firewall performing AES-GCM operations. In order to compare this work with
existing solutions, firewalls approach is transposed in a centralized approach as it is proposed in the
SECA model [21].
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Figure 19: Distributed and centralized behaviors
In a distributed approach (as firewalls, see Figure 19a), security controls are performed locally and
monitoring information is sent to the security manager when an attack is detected (this is done by
the monitoring IP and the update processor). In a centralized approach ([21], see Figure 19b), each
security interface sends information to the security manager doing all the security controls. These
connections are considered as trusted areas, but centralization implies latency overhead for commu-
nications between each interface and the manager. This work considers that each transaction (a
roundtrip between an interface and a manager) through an AXI-Lite bus requires 4 additional clock
cycles [26, 34]. Therefore, for the previously defined picDec application, a centralized implementation
gives a 6.18% latency overhead while the distributed firewall approach has a 4.18% overhead (a 33%
gain compared to SECA approach).
5.3.3 Memory occupancy
According to firewall description detailed in Section 3, internal memories can be used to store:
• Security policies: parameters to be verified by firewalls.
• Timestamps: used by the AES-GCM core to protect against replay attacks. It is assumed that
timestamps are generated with internal counters.
• Tags: when an external memory section has to be protected in terms of integrity, a tag is
needed.
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This work only focuses on tags produced by the AES-GCM core. For each 128-bit data, a tag of
equal length is stored. Therefore, we can only protect 1.87MB of data in terms of integrity in a
Xilinx ML605 board (XC6VLX240T1156-1 FPGA).
• At first sight, this can be a limiting factor. A more efficient approach would be the use of Bloom
filters [35, 36]: under specific conditions, this technique can decrease the memory footprint by
96%.
• However, firewalls offer flexibility in terms of system security. In accordance with user require-
ments, data may not always be protected in terms of integrity (firewalls are able to detect other
threats).
6 Conclusion and future work
Several related works show an interest in communication and memory protection. Nevertheless,
no approach has addressed the need for cryptographic functions aiming at protecting memories
with monitoring and controls function providing communication protection. The distributed firewall
approach allows embedded system developers to protect both communications and memories in a
multiprocessor architecture.
Firewalls implementation shows that security can be provided only with hardware firewalls.
The additional software is only for update purposes (attack detection, new configurations com-
putation. . . ). This work proposes a low-latency solution where latency overheads can reach 17%
(according to cryptographic features set in firewalls).
One perspective regarding our firewalls approach is a software protection: firewalls would analyze
data according to the current software task identifier, which allows refining the security level of the
overall solution. Finally, even if hardware security is a recent domain, it is possible to implement effi-
cient functions; we believe that technology improvements (for instance, multi-layer FPGAs or hybrid
platforms embedding FPGAs and processors) will allow going further in protection of multiprocessor
architectures.
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